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ABSTRACT
This article explains why a considerable part of the International
Relations literature frames highly complex energy relations
between the EU and Russia in terms of simple, exclusive geopo-
litical intentions. Drawing on Construal Level Theory, it addresses
the gap between immediate interaction between various private
and public actors with their own agendas and individual inten-
tionalities and assumed collective geopolitical intentionalities.
Because of the degree of abstraction, collective motivations are
attributed to actors like Russia and the EU. This attribution risks to
be subject to bias. It is argued that higher psychological distance
increases the likelihood of more radical and ideologised framing.
These abstract schemes do not follow from the endogenous
energy dynamics but are function of a broader logic of competi-
tion which has characterised EU-Russia relations.
Introduction
This article seeks to explain the gap between hugely complex EU-Russia energy
realities and policies on one hand and its simple framing as a one-dimensional
geopolitical issue in a large part of the literature on the other. Over the past
decade, in particular since the 2006 gas spat, energy relations between Russia and
the EU have been framed strongly in geopolitical terms. In a considerable part of
the International Relations literature – though much less in specialised litera-
ture – energy relations and dependence have frequently been formulated in
terms of power, interests and security. Often they have been presented as pure
geostrategic issues, as if the arms race of the ColdWar had simply been replaced
by a race for scarce energy resources. However, contributions of this type
approach energy relations in a reductionist way. The daily reality of energy
relations is extremely complex. It is made up of a panoply of actors: producers,
consumers, governments, regulators, etc. Each of these actors comes with their
own specific motivations, preferences, interests, perceptions, and logics. Their
choices and behaviour are not determined by one overarching ‘Russian’ or ‘EU’
frame but depend on the specific context in which each of them operates.
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The metaphor of a new ‘great game’ has also been used regularly to refer to
competitive energy relations at global level and how new players – like China – or
strategic decisions may change power constellations.1 As a result, events like the
gas deal between Russia and China in 2014 are easily seen as a rebalancing of
forces between major contenders in a global competitive context. Again the
metaphor of the great game obfuscates a hugely complex world. Energy relations
are as much about commercial profit, regulation, interests of individual countries
and companies, as they are about security of supply or strategic interests.
Particularly in the case of EU-Russia relations, a geostrategic framing of
energy relations has become widespread despite being contested by a con-
siderable number of energy experts. Levels of energy dependence tend to get
overstated and geostrategic objectives tend to be read into energy policies.
The central research question of this article can be summarised as follows:
how can the tendency to frame EU-Russia energy relations in exclusively
geopolitical terms be explained? The answer to this research question will be
driven by Construal-Level Theory (CLT), a theory from Social Psychology. In
essence this theory will help us to understand how at an abstract level one
tends to overlook the enormous complexity of day-to-day energy relations
and to replace it by simple, in this case geopolitical, explanations. When
studying the behaviour of one specific energy actor (say an energy company)
in a given case, we can analyse their behaviour at a fairly low level of
abstraction. In contrast, when we analyse EU-Russia energy relations in its
entirety, we have no choice but reducing these relations (with its multitude of
public and private actors, all with their own agendas) to a higher level of
abstraction. As a result, we attribute ‘collective intentions’ to understand
Russia’s and the EU’s energy behaviour. It is at this point that there is a
tendency to read simple collective geopolitical intentions into extremely
complex energy relations, as if the latter were all driven by a grand geopo-
litical strategy. By applying this theory to the field of energy studies, this
article makes a new theoretical contribution. It contributes to the field by
dissecting how the motivations and intentions of individual energy actors
relate to the collective intentions which we tend to assume in the behaviour
of actors like the EU or Russia. While essential to the field, this aspect – how
we come to understand collective intentions amidst a multitude of diverging
individual intentions – has hardly been the focus of any research on energy
policies (with Aalto 2014 as a notable exception, see below).
It logically follows that the focus of the article is on the framing of energy
relations and not on actual policies, which should be examined in all their
complexity and multi-dimensionality. It will be argued that this widespread
tendency to frame EU-Russia energy relations as driven by collective geopo-
litical motivations is one-sided. It is reductionist, because it reads exclusive
geopolitical motivations into energy policies (and overlooks commercial
motivations for example). It will be argued that this one-sided framing of
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energy relations is a reflection of a more general understanding of relations
between Russia and the West as driven by geopolitical considerations and
competition rather than the result of endogenous energy dynamics.
Reductionist Approaches to EU-Russia Energy Relations
Ever since the gas spats between Russia and Ukraine in 2006 and 2009, a
large part of the International Relations literature has approached EU-Russia
energy relations as issues of high politics2 or even security.3 This focus on
energy as geostrategic and security issue has led to a tendency to aggrandise
power-related motivations.4 The one-dimensional explanations of these con-
tributions stand in sharp contrast with energy realities, which are charac-
terised by complexity and high degrees of differentiation.
There are three ways in which the complexity of energy relations is
reduced in this literature to simple schemes of inter-state competition over
scarce resources. First, the field of energy relations is largely limited to the
production and transmission of energy resources. The crucial prism through
which energy policies are understood is ownership of or control over
resources and pipelines. Other aspects like regulation, price setting, commer-
cial competition, etc., get a priori a secondary role in explaining policies. This
tends to marginalise factors which are crucial to understanding EU-Russia
energy relations, such as market access and regulation.
Second, agency is reduced and confined to a specific set of actors, most
notably governments or companies which are seen as closely intertwined
with the government, such as Gazprom. Other actors receive little attention,
such as diverse private companies, consumers, retailers, regulators, interna-
tional organisations, etc. As a result, energy is seen in a reductionist way as a
purely intergovernmental matter.
The third form of reductionism has to do with the way in which motiva-
tions are studied. With a focus on state actors, motivations are narrowed to
state ‘interests’, embodied by the selected government or government-related
actors, in the limited field of resource and pipeline competition. As they
embody high politics, this leads to a one-sided understanding of their policies
as security or strategically driven. This leaves other motivations, such as
profit, out of the scope. Moreover, actors in the energy field are not only
assumed to be driven exclusively by their interests, but also to dispose of
complete and undistorted information. They are assumed to act in a rational
way, without distortion of their view of the context in which they operate.
Finally, they are assumed to be driven by a collective set of motivations,
rather than dispersed and contradictory motivations.
Before we move to the theoretical section, however, it should be under-
lined that many specialists in the field of energy have criticised reductionist
approaches to EU-Russia energy relations and pleaded for more nuanced
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approaches. Some studies have questioned the absence of economic motiva-
tions to explain differences in behaviour between Russia as producer of
energy and the EU as consumer.5 Others have questioned the degree of
asymmetrical dependence6 or the assumption that Russia can use its energy
sources as a political weapon.7 Still others have focused on regulatory and
institutional issues and how they have impeded market access.8 A growing
body of literature also takes into account the organisational complexity of
energy markets and policies or the variety of motivations underlying
policies.9 In this respect Goldthau and Boersma have highlighted the ‘gap
between the policy world and the realities of energy markets’.10
The existence of different aspects and drivers of energy policies has
definitely been recognised in literature. It is conventional to distinguish
between economic, ecological and political/security drivers of energy
policies.11 A Clingendael report for the European Commission made a
distinction between a scenario of ‘markets and institutions’ versus a scenario
of ‘regions and empires’.12 However, it considers both scenarios as mutually
exclusive rather than coexisting. What is largely lacking is a genuine inter-
disciplinary approach, which studies diverse strategies of a multitude of
actors for a legal, economic, environmental, security disciplinary perspective.
Intentionalities, Construals and Attributional Bias
This section introduces a theoretical model that helps us to understand how
we tend to frame EU-Russia energy relations in terms of collective geopoli-
tical understandings. As a first step, the social structurationist model of Aalto
et al. is introduced, explaining the link between what they call individual and
collective ‘intentionalities’.13 In a second step we move beyond this model
and its assumption that individual intentionalities stabilise into a ‘collective
intentionality’.14 Drawing on CLT, we instead try to understand how simple
collective geopolitical intentionalities are read into extremely complex energy
policies. In a third step the concept of ‘attributional bias’15 is introduced to
explain the tendency to attribute behaviour of the political out-group to bad
intent, while that of the in-group is understood in terms of environmental
constraints.
In an attempt to mend the lack of interdisciplinary approach, Aalto et al.
attempt to set up ‘a new analytical model that facilitates collaboration across
a wide range of disciplines to study the formation of energy policy’.16 Their
social structurationist model focuses on the processes in which energy policy
takes form as actors try to understand and react to the environment around
them. The information they dispose of is imperfect and ‘their ability to realise
their interests depends upon the practices by which they acquire information
of those environments’.17 The diverse actors operating and contributing to
energy policies – producers and consumers, regulators, institutions, private
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companies, etc. – all have their own ‘individual intentionality’. The latter is
not determined by ‘objective’ interests following from an actor’s position, but
are determined by how an actor frames and makes sense of a situation and
links its intentions to it.18 As a result, incompatible frames can and are likely
to appear. Collective intentionality will be the product of different individual
intentionalities, when they stabilise into a policy (but continue to evolve). On
the basis of two case studies Aalto et al. conclude that the sequence of choices
made by diverse actors about their actions suggests that Russia’s energy
relations are guided primarily by business and profit interests rather than
geopolitics or energy economics, as currently often perceived.19
This leads to the question of why the collective intentionality behind EU-
Russia energy relations is predominantly perceived in geopolitical terms
rather than the business intentionality found by Aalto et al. Building on
their approach, we explore how general framing20 of EU-Russia political
relations (and the negative images they hold of each other) impacts on the
framing of energy relations and the interpretation of each other’s energy
behaviour. In other words, it is argued that framing of general EU-Russia
political and strategic relations as competitive and driven by geopolitical
interests is likely to be reproduced in a similar framing of their energy
relations. ‘Building on Wendt, competing frames can become more conse-
quential to the extent that international cultures connoting deeper “enemy”
type structures resonate with actors’ interpretations of “events”’.21
In this article we will explore this link between deeper enemy type structures
and the framing of energy relations by drawing from theories of social psychology
on abstraction of mental representations and on the attribution of negative
intentions to out-groups. The abstraction of mental representations is the specific
focus of CLT,22 which begins with the observation that how andwhat we think is a
function of the self and the immediate. In order to think about something, we need
to transcend the self and immediate. This we do by ‘construals’ – forms of mental
representations. The core of CLT is that the higher the distance is to our direct
experience, the higher the level of construal will be, i.e., the more abstract the
mental representation will be. Distance can take different forms: spatial, temporal,
social or hypothetical. Distance will affect how we evaluate things and our
decisions on the action to be taken.
High-level construals are thus ‘relatively abstract, coherent and super-
ordinate mental representations’,23 in contrast to more concrete, immediate
and specific low-level construals. Take the example of an exam one has to
take. If the exam is at a distant point in the future, one is likely to think of it
in abstract terms of performing well or gaining knowledge. When the exam
gets close, one thinks in specific terms like finishing a chapter from the
textbook or even finding the venue of the exam. Thus, ‘CLT contends that
people use increasingly higher levels of construal to represent an object as the
psychological distance from the object increases. This is because high-level
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construals are more likely than low-level construals to remain unchanged as
one gets closer to an object or farther away from it.’24
Abstract, high-level construals are less likely to change over time. The
other way around, holding perceptions constant, requires abstraction. High-
level construals are not necessarily more vague, but may lead to more radical
choices: ‘People seem to appreciate proximal outcomes for their low-level
aspects and distal outcomes for their high-level aspects. Although they often
know less about distant than near outcomes, their evaluation of the distant
outcomes might be more extreme when high-level construal of the outcomes
have strong evaluative implications.’25
When translated to political action and choice, values and ideologies are
typically abstract structures and their chances of being used are much higher
in case of situations of psychological distance. ‘CLT predicts that when an
attitude object is psychologically near, evaluations will be attuned to a
particular social context and therefore more likely to be affected by incidental
attitudes of others in the social situation rather than by one’s ideology.
Conversely, when the attitude object is psychologically distant, it will be
abstracted away from its local context, and evaluation will therefore be less
affected by the incidental attitudes of salient others and, instead, reflect one’s
ideology.’26
Translated to the different energy realities in this article, this implies that
in daily commercial interactions in the energy sector, the level of construal
tends to be lower. Businessmen or technicians are likely to think about
energy in more immediate terms. In the case of energy security and energy
diplomacy, the psychological distance is much bigger and there is a strong
inclination to think in abstract terms. These will be ‘abstracted away from its
local context’ and are more prone to be represented in broad ideological
schemes. As a result, choices for action in the case of hypothetical distance
(in the possible case of a gas supply crisis) and at temporal distance (at an
undetermined point in the future) tend to be more extreme. Linking this to
the idea of intentionalities,27 there is a tendency to lose sight of the specifics
(the individual intentionalities) and to reduce the complexity to stable col-
lective intentionalities.
Extending this to the images we construct of the Other, CLT uses the
concept of correspondence bias, ‘a tendency toward a high-level construal of
behavior in terms of abstract, decontextualized dispositions’.28 This concept
is paralleled by a second concept from social psychology: the concept of
‘attributional bias’.29 The starting point is ‘that the ordinary function of
human cognition cleaves the social world into “self” and “other” categories of
agency’.30 Categories of in-group and out-group are created on the basis of
simple divisions between groups, which are linked to divergent identities. As
‘political categories become more salient’,31 the parties will exaggerate the
identities both of the in-group and of the out-group.
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Kowert argues that there is a tendency ‘to exaggerate differences between
political groups and to underestimate differences within these groups’.32 The
coherence of the in-group is overrated and contrasted with the out-group
with which the differences are exaggerated. Moreover, there is a tendency ‘to
attribute the behaviour of political out-groups to the intent or desire of those
groups; in-group behaviour, however, will more often be attributed to the
influence of environmental constraints. Perceived increases in the power of
out-groups will strengthen the tendency to assume intent (attributional
bias).’33
Linking this to CLT, the attributional bias is more likely to occur
in situations of high-level construal. Complementary to Aalto et al.,34 it is
claimed that competing frames are more likely to occur in the abstract, high-
level construal of energy security, than in the low-level construal of daily
commercial or technical interaction. Abstracted from the immediate, local
context, high-level construals of energy relations are more prone to be
embedded in ‘deep enemy like structures’.
Reductionist Schemes of Excessive Dependence
Before applying this theory to EU-Russia energy relations, the point needs to
be made (or rather reiterated) why a considerable part of the literature is
reductionist in ascribing geopolitical and security motivations to understand
collective intentions behind energy policies.35 As argued above, this literature
reflects a widespread tendency to analyse EU-Russia energy relations in terms
of high politics and/or security, in which actors determine their strategies in
function of their geostrategic interests. A key word in this literature is
dependence. It is assumed that asymmetrical energy interdependence36 is
excessive, therefore leading to concerns about shifting power relations (in
the cases of political approaches) or fears about threats to survival (in the
case of security approaches). While acknowledging that there is asymmetrical
energy interdependence between the EU and Russia, reducing energy rela-
tions and motivations underlying energy policies to this dependence is one-
sided. There are four main reductionist elements, which have been described
in literature.37
First the ‘power factor’ in energy relations is isolated from other fields.
Power relations are predominantly assessed in function of energy depen-
dence, leaving other fields of interaction out of the equation. The dependence
of EU countries on Russian gas comes to be seen as the main determinant of
power relations. For example, the fact that the Russian economy – before the
Ukraine crisis – represented only one tenth of the EU’s economy is not taken
into account.38 One could also argue that this interpretation uses a one-sided
concept of power. In terms of the taxonomy of power of Barnett and
Duvall,39 it reflects compulsory power, the capacity of one actor to control
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the other. Zero-sum interpretations of power fit this relational category. In
the energy field this may refer to the control over energy supplies. Other
forms of power, like institutional power are not taken into account. In this
case power is diffuse, indirect and area-specific. Rather than referring to
direct control over an actor, institutional power is about indirect control over
the conditions under which an actor can act.40 This may refer to the con-
straining impact of institutions. It goes without saying that this is of parti-
cular importance in the energy sector, where control over law, regulatory
mechanisms or technical standards may involve institutional power over the
conditions in which other actors operate.
Second, dependence tends to be reduced to supply dependence. The
‘control over outcomes’ which is generated by the asymmetry of interdepen-
dence is assumed to exist for supply dependence only: the dependence of EU
states on the supply of Russian gas. The fact that Russia is strongly dependent
on demand for Russian gas in the EU is largely ignored (although see the
contribution by Sharples to this special section). Also, what is called ‘depen-
dence’ is often assumed to automatically entail – in the terms of Keohane and
Nye – dependence vulnerability, implying heavy costs in the longer term.
However, if alternative sources of supply or demand exist, the real effects
may only be short term. In such cases there should be a sensitivity to levels of
dependence rather than necessarily viewing them in terms of vulnerability.
Third, the way dependence is assessed in a considerable part of the
literature, is itself problematic. Supply dependence is often simply reduced
to import dependence. The share of Russian gas in EU gas imports is wrongly
seen as an indicator for the degree of dependence. This leaves endogenous
production of gas within the EU out of the equation. While Russia’s share in
EU gas imports is around one third (31.5% in 2008), its share in EU gas
consumption is lower at one quarter (24.4% in 2008). If we consider the total
energy mix, Russian gas accounts for 6.5% of the primary energy consump-
tion in the EU only.41
Fourth, the widely held perception that the EU has seen an exceptional
and excessive growth in levels of dependence does not match reality. Today
the EU imports proportionally less gas from Russia than it did at the end of
the Cold War. In 2008, just before the financial crisis, the Russian share in
gas imports of the EU-27 was 31.5%. In 1990, in the late days of the Soviet
Union, the Russian (not Soviet) share in gas imports of these 27 countries
was 75%.42 Dependence has thus decreased, rather than increased.
Since the last gas spat between Russia and Ukraine in 2009, higher
intensity energy conflicts involving the EU and Russia have actually
decreased. Driven by concerns over its credibility as a reliable supplier of
energy, Russia and the EU have signed a Memorandum on an Early Warning
Mechanism on energy supply disruptions after the 2009 gas crisis.43 This
mechanism has been effectively invoked and gas conflicts between Russia and
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third parties (Ukraine, Belarus) have not provoked major disruptions for EU
states since then. The asymmetry of energy interdependence has been further
reduced through the EU’s diversification strategy. Not only have EU states
diversified the energy sources and the countries of origin, progress has also
been made in building more interconnections between national gas networks
and solving the issue of energy islands. Moreover the EU has invested in
reverse flow technology to allow gas to be redirected from west to east rather
than the conventional east to west transit direction for Russian gas. This
energy security strategy predates the current conflict over Ukraine, but has
been accelerated in function of it. All this has prepared the EU better for gas
interruptions under different scenarios.44
It should be reiterated here that this article deals with the dominant
framing of energy relations in the International Relations literature, not
with the actual behaviour of Russia and the EU. It may be argued that
stronger geopolitical and security rhetoric has appeared in both cases, but
this rhetoric hides a much bigger complexity, in which energy relations
continued (until the Ukraine crisis) within the Energy Dialogue and (also
after the Ukraine crisis) at a technical and commercial level. The EU has put
a greater emphasis on energy security particularly since 2006, but policy-
makers have always continued to emphasise that interdependence was key to
energy relations. While measures were taken to increase the diversification of
supply, its policies continued to be driven to a large extent by commercial
and technical considerations. Energy relations were constituted at various
levels (European and national), by different actors (private and public), from
different policy fields (energy, trade, competition, environment, foreign pol-
icy). Also in Russia there are complex energy relations and policies behind a
more assertive rhetoric and the objective of diversifying energy markets. This
appears, for example, from the Russian Energy Strategy until 2030, which
covers a wide variety of objectives and strongly reflects other than geopoli-
tical motivations.45 Also in their case study of the Sakhalin projects, which is
often seen as politically driven, Aalto et al. find ‘profit interests and business
frames best explaining the conduct of the two Sakhalin projects’.46
That energy policies are de facto rather isolated from grand foreign
policies, is illustrated by the conflict that has unravelled over Ukraine in
2014. The derailing of acrimonious relations into a militarised conflict with a
huge potential of escalation seems to have left the field of energy largely
unaffected. In other words, energy, for many the perceived ‘threat’ par
excellence during the decade preceding the Ukraine crisis, has not played a
significant role in the confrontation between Russia and the EU after arms
were taken up. This may seem surprising, given the earlier gas spats of 2006
and 2009. One could have expected that in the much more extreme circum-
stances of a confrontation over Ukraine and of military build-up, any of the
parties would have resorted to energy as an instrument in the conflict. This is
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not what happened. Except for oil industry technology, the sanctions
imposed by the EU and the US have not directly targeted the Russian energy
sector. The other way around, Russia has not used the ‘energy weapon’ and
cut off gas supplies to European states. Moreover, the EU acted as a broker
between Moscow and Kyiv in the midst of the crisis – with the Strategic
Partnership suspended – and provided financial guarantees in the so-called
Winter Package. It seems to be implicitly agreed that energy business will
continue as usual, despite the confrontation over Ukraine. This is not to say
that there have been no tensions between Brussels and Moscow over energy.
There was the decision to suspend the South Stream project. Moscow was
also not amused by the European Commission’s antitrust case against
Gazprom. However, neither of these cases were part of the conflict dynamics
over Ukraine. They did not result from the conflict, nor were they stakes
within the conflict. Moreover, these disagreements have characterised EU-
Russia relations for many years. There is little reason to assume that the level
of conflict over energy was higher than before the Ukraine crisis, certainly in
comparison to the gas spats of 2006 and 2009.
Energy and the Geopoliticisation of EU-Russia Energy Relations
The previous sections have illustrated how a considerable part of the analysis
of EU-Russia energy relations is prone to reductionism. In this type of
framing the complexity of energy relations is reduced to a simple all-
encompassing scheme of excessive dependence, which is assumed to create
challenges for power or for survival itself. The collective intentionality
assumed is that of governmental actors driven by their national interests,
entangled in a geopolitical competition that is ultimately determined by
control over resources and pipelines. Against the background of CLT, this
section now seeks to explain how this geopolitical framing became dominant,
while it is not reflected in the complexity of energy relations and policies.
As argued above, the interpretation that the collective intentionality
behind the energy policies in Moscow and the EU is geopolitical, is not
confirmed by evidence.47 We therefore need to explain why a geopolitical
framing of energy relations as driven by a geopolitical collective intention-
ality became so powerful in literature and sometimes resonates in the policy
world itself. In doing so, we make abstraction of different global factors that
played a role, such as growing energy demand and prices. Instead the focus is
on the endogenous logic of EU-Russia bilateral relations. It is argued that a
broader political process of geopoliticisation of EU-Russia relations took
place – outside the energy sector – in which both parties started to frame
each other’s behaviour increasingly in terms of assumed geopolitical agendas.
In line with what has been explained above, this is the result of abstract high-
level framing or construal. The concept of ‘attributional bias’48 helps to
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explain why the framing was characterised by an increasingly negative inter-
pretation of each other’s behaviour and producing abstract ‘enemy-like
structures’. It is this type of abstract structures that have fostered a one-
sided negative geopolitical reading of energy relations, obfuscating the under-
lying complexity.
Drawing on CLT, framing the intentionality behind the energy policy of
Moscow or Brussels implies a high psychological distance and thus requires a
high degree of abstraction. As argued above, high-level construals are more
likely to be affected by broader ideological schemes. In other words, if it is
hard to make sense of an extremely complex energy world, one is bound to
resort to simple abstract, ideological frames to make sense of energy policies.
It is thus the distance between the immediate proximity of manifold micro
energy environments and the level of macro energy policies, that explains
why we are inclined not to understand energy intentionalities from an
endogenous perspective, but to attribute qualities to these intentionalities
on the basis of exogenous, broader ideological schemes and interpretations of
EU-Russia political and strategic relations in general. CLT thus helps to
understand why the field of energy relations is prone to highly abstract,
ideologised and more extreme interpretations.
The concept of ‘attributional bias’,49 in turn, helps to explain the negative
dynamics these abstract, ideologised interpretations have acquired long
before the crisis over Ukraine. The core idea behind the concept is that
actors do not behave on the basis of actual behaviour but on the basis of
images they hold of each other. They redefine each other’s identity and tend
to aggrandise differences between themselves (the in-group) and the other
(the out-group). In a context of psychological distance and diverging pre-
ferences, this is likely to result in a situation where one actor reads bad
intentions into the behaviour of the other. This attribution of negative
behaviour becomes the dominant frame. Each step taken by the counterpart
is seen as a negative step, intended to weaken or obstruct the in-group. Self-
evidently, this is not a sudden process. As identities evolve in the process of
interaction, the attribution of negative intentions grows and gets mutually
reinforced, up to the point where it gets detached from actual behaviour. The
interaction happens on the basis of the images of what the counterpart has
become, not of what it has done.
The ‘attributional bias’ is at the heart of EU-Russia relations as they have
developed roughly over the last decade. Long before the conflict in Ukraine
and the annexation of Crimea, both have developed increasingly negative
images of each other in a downward spiral. They have come to frame each
other’s behaviour in terms of the assumed intention to build a sphere of
influence at the expense of the other, where there may have been no
conscious intention to do so at the onset. A clear instance of this is the
reference by Segey Lavrov, Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs, to the Eastern
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Partnership as ‘an attempt to expand the EU’s sphere of influence’.50 His
quote is to be seen in a context where Russian leaders had become convinced
that the West’s objective was to weaken Russia. There are many similar
quotes to be found on both sides, illustrating an escalating logic of competi-
tion between the EU and Russia, driven by the attribution of negative
geopolitical intentions to each other. The abstract, ideological schemes used
are reinforced by the selective reading of certain events, such as the Russia-
Ukraine gas spats of 2006 and 2009, which, interpreted through these
schemes, only confirm and reinforce them.
We thus enter a logic of competition, where the behaviour of the counter-
part is understood as bad-intended steps in a process of zero-sum competi-
tion. The result is a spiral of distrust and a further increasing psychological
distance. One could argue that abstract geopolitical framing sneaked into
foreign policy and was fostered by the increasingly negative images as a result
of the escalating logic of competition. In Russia a new discourse of geopo-
litics became more influential as images gained ground that the ambition of
the EU and the West in general was to increase its influence at Russia’s
expense. Moscow’s foreign policy got incrementally geopoliticised as the logic
of competition developed. Given that Putin’s foreign policy in his early years
as president was firmly based on the economisation of foreign policy,51 it is
fair to assume that this was not so much a conscious strategic choice, but
more the result of an interactive process of stepwise radicalisation of the
images it held of the EU’s intentions.
Though less evident, the same arguably holds for the EU, conventionally
seen as less driven by geopolitical motivations. While the objectives of the
European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) and Eastern Partnership (EaP) may
not have been explicitly geopolitical, they were seen by Moscow to be
geopolitically motivated. Rather than seeking direct strategic control or
coercion, these regional policies were aimed at extending the EU’s legal
and economic sphere by transferring its rules to neighbouring countries in
Association Agreements based on Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade. This
created an increase in the ‘normative hegemony’52 of the EU and had the
potential to anchor Ukraine in wider European structures. From a Russian
perspective this clashed with what it considered to be its vital national
interests and ambitions as regional power. While there is an immediate
technical incompatibility of membership of the Eurasian Customs Union
(now Eurasian Economic Union) and the DCFTA arrangements with the
EU, it is the attributional bias that explains why both projects were seen as
mutually exclusive and threatening. Moscow and Brussels did not see each
other’s regional integration plans as neutral forms of economic cooperation.
In a context of negative images of competition, they framed them mutually as
aggressive attempts to increase influence and enhance one’s geostrategic
interests. It is these abstract negative political images that have proven to
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be a fertile ground for one-sided geopolitical interpretations of energy rela-
tions, making abstraction of the multi-dimensional complex micro-settings
of interaction in the field.
Conclusion
This article has sought to explain why a considerable part of the International
Relations literature tends to frame EU-Russia energy relations in terms of
exclusive geopolitical intentions, thus obfuscating very complex and highly
differentiated realities of energy relations and reducing them to issues of high
politics.
The analysis started from the fact that energy relations and policies are the
result of the actions of a wide variety and diversity of actors and their
individual intentions. The preferences they hold and the choices they make
are determined by the way they understand the immediate energy context in
which they operate. While Aalto et al.53 claim that these individual inten-
tionalities produce fairly stable collective intentionalities, this article argued
that the construction of these collective intentionalities is predominantly a
function of the broader political framing of EU-Russia relations exogenous to
the energy field. In other words, geopolitical competition gets read into
energy relations. Geopolitical schemes start to operate as an abstract frame
through which collective intentions are attributed and behaviour is explained.
CLT was used to understand how abstract schemes came to dominate the
framing of EU-Russia energy relations. In a situation of high psychological
distance, the likelihood of more radical and ideologised abstract schemes
increases. This explains the gap between the immediate interaction in the
energy sector at the level of individual intentionalities – where experience is
direct and decisions are less prone to major ideological schemes – and the
abstract level of assumed collective intentionalities, where the framing is
subject to more radical and ideologised schemes.
On this basis it was argued that the assumed geopolitical collective inten-
tionality of Russian energy policies and actions (which Aalto and many
authors find problematic), follows from the logic of competition which has
developed in EU-Russia political relations over roughly the last decade rather
than from the endogenous dynamics of energy interaction. The abstract
perception of inevitable competition has led to an incremental geopoliticisa-
tion of relations at a general political level, which in turn was reproduced in
the interpretation of relations in the energy sector. The concept of ‘attribu-
tional bias’, equally taken from Social Psychology, clarifies how the EU and
Russia started to hold negative images of one another, attributing their
counterpart bad intentions of geopolitical manoeuvring and power aggrand-
isement. In a process of gradual escalation, these images have radicalised up
to the point where the EU and Russia regarded and evaluated each other in
GEOPOLITICS 775
function of the images they had created of each other, rather than on the
basis of actual behaviour. As a result, enemy-like deeper structures took the
upper hand in framing their relations, including in the field of energy.
This analysis forces us to think about the way we assume collective
intentions behind an actor’s behaviour in the energy field, rather than
accepting that this behaviour is steered by manifold individual and cross-
cutting intentions. While this complexity is recognised by a considerable
number of experts, this issue – how complex, diverging individual intentions
relate to assumed simple collective intentions – has hardly been the subject of
analysis. This article suggests that there is a need to rethink this relation by
distinguishing between the different levels of abstraction, with individual
intentions reflecting a more immediate and concrete level, while collective
intentions are framed at an abstract and ideological level that is subject to
images and perceptions exogenous to energy relations themselves.
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